Imagine there's no diagnosis, it's easy if you try by Kinderman, Peter
 Psychopathology Review 
PR Volume 2 (2015), Issue 1, 154-161 
ISSN 2051-8315 / DOI:10.5127/pr.00 
 
 
Imagine there’s no diagnosis, it’s easy if you try 
Peter Kinderman 
University of Livaerpool, UK 
Abstract 
The recent discussions over the reliability, validity, utility, humanity and epistemology of psychiatric diagnosis have 
had wider implications than might at first sight be apparent. Diagnosis is, for many people, both the entry-point to 
services and the starting-point for public debate. Challenges to the scientific and professional basis for diagnosis, 
therefore, can have profound implications. Such is the dominance of traditional diagnostic thinking about mental 
health care that it is often wrongly assumed that there is little alternative – or that any possible alternatives would 
require lengthy and expensive periods of development. In fact, there is no present impediment to the development 
of new ways of thinking and delivering services, and especially no impediment to practical and scientifically valid 
alternatives to diagnosis. 
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Introduction 
Problems with diagnosis 
There have been long-standing concerns with diagnostic systems in psychiatry, which have always been criticised 
for their poor reliability, validity, utility, epistemology and humanity. These criticisms have been outlined elsewhere 
(British Medical Journal, 2013; Division of Clinical Psychology, 2013; Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 2012; 
Lancet, 2012) and in other papers in this special issue. Although it is possible for diagnoses to be reliable, the 
 Psychopathology Review, Volume 2 (2015), Issue 1, 154-161 155 
careful clinical protocols necessary to achieve this are rarely adopted in clinical settings. In addition, of course, it is 
entirely possible to make reliable diagnoses of entirely invalid diagnoses - the mere fact that there is agreement 
between diagnosticians is no guarantee that the diagnoses about which they agree actually correspond to 
meaningful clusters of symptoms, with distinct pathophysiology and aetiology, which predict the effectiveness of 
particular treatments. We have seen many potentially reliable but nevertheless invalid ‘diagnoses’ in the past. 
Although human sexuality is a wonderfully multi-faceted concept, and therefore there is little reliability in social 
constructs of sexuality, something of the nature of the invalidity of supposed diagnoses can be seen in the way that 
non-conventional expressions of sexuality have moved from being sins to being illnesses before being accepted (I 
hope) as merely part of what makes us all human. 
Many people educated in the history of mental health know that a 19th century American doctor called Samuel 
Cartwright seriously suggested that slaves who attempted to escape from their captors were suffering from the 
mental illness of ‘drapetomania’ (Caplan, McCartney, & Sisti, 2004; Cartwright, 1851) although it’s very important to 
acknowledge that the establishment of the time did not accept his proposals. The same cannot be said about the 
establishment stance towards sexuality. Whereas we now (and I certainly) regard the various complex variants of 
sexuality something to celebrate, including finding members of your own gender sexually attractive, it was not until 
1973 that the American Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder. Something of the 
influence of the American system can be seen in the fact that the World Health Organization followed in 
declassifying homosexuality as a ‘disorder’ in 1990. It has taken some time for sexual preferences to disappear 
from the diagnostic manuals. Currently a vestige of this approach can be seen in the fact that persistent and 
marked distress about your own sexual orientation remains a focus for some diagnosis. It’s worth being clear, here. 
Distress, of course, is important. But it is significant (I believe) that diagnosticians choose when to draw attention to 
such issues as sexuality in the criteria for diagnosis. While it seems important to note if distress is associated with 
sexuality, we do not see such diagnoses as ‘parental rejection distress syndrome’, ‘heterosexual inadequacy 
syndrome’ or ‘post redundancy impoverishment stress disorder’. These labels do not reflect real entities, revealed 
by systematic observation, but rather mirror contemporaneous social values.  
These discussions are important. Returning briefly (for illustrative purposes) to so-called disorders of sexuality, we 
know that a range of ‘therapies’ – from aversion therapy to more modern approaches based on what is, in my 
opinion, a perverted version of CBT – have been proposed to ‘treat’ or ‘cure’ people of their homosexuality (see, for 
instance, Scott, 2013). How we describe psychological problems is intimately associated with how we choose to 
respond. And the ways we are encouraged to think about psychological problems in diagnostic manuals such as 
DSM-5 remain very worrying.  
The poor validity of psychiatric diagnoses is reflected in their failure to predict prognosis or the likely benefit (or 
otherwise) of treatment options, and in their failure to map onto biological findings, which are typically highly 
nonspecific and cross diagnostic boundaries. Diagnoses in psychiatry have consequential epistemological 
problems. Once made, the diagnoses are used as pseudo-explanations for troubling behaviours - it is presumed 
that people are behaving as they are, or experiencing unusual perceptions, because of the illness. But, in the 
absence of valid underlying pathological processes, this argument is logically circular – the behaviour is explained 
by a label which consists of nothing more than a shorthand for that behaviour. The diagnostic approach also 
threatens our humane and empathic response. Since diagnoses subtly or unsubtly convey the idea that mental 
health problems can be understood as illnesses or diseases, as pathologies of the body, we are in danger of 
ignoring any psychological meaning in people’s ‘disordered’ responses and experiences. This tends to limit the 
extent to which people understand how they might use their own resources to address their difficulties.  
As other papers in this special edition detail, the recent publication of DSM-5 threatens to exacerbate these 
problems. Many fear that DSM-5, if used in clinical practice, would lead to a lowering of a swathe of diagnostic 
thresholds, and inflate the assumed prevalence of mental health problems in the general population. Many have 
commented on the fears that this may not be unrelated to the commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies, 
and that this is a potential threat to the general public and especially vulnerable populations such as children and 
older people (Lancet, 2012). 
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An alternative 
As has been argued elsewhere (Kinderman et al., 2012), we need a wholesale revision of the way we think about 
psychological distress. That revision should be far-reaching and comprehensive, and include service delivery and 
ethos as well as assessment issues. But this paper is specifically concerned with diagnosis and assessment. And 
in that area, we already have available alternative approaches to diagnosis.  
Any system for identifying, describing and responding to distress should use language and processes that reflect 
the fact that such distress is a normal, not abnormal, part of human life; we occasionally respond to difficult 
circumstances by becoming distressed. Our approach to assessing and communicating about such distress must 
also be able to accommodate the overwhelming evidence that psychiatric symptoms lie on continua with less 
unusual and distressing mental states. There is no easy ‘cut-off’ between ‘normal’ experience and ‘disorder’. Such 
language should also recognise that there is clear evidence that psychosocial factors such as poverty, 
unemployment and trauma are major causal factors for psychological distress (Read & Bentall, 2012). 
Rather than use diagnostic labels for putative ‘disorders’, therefore, we should instead simply list a person’s 
problems. A simple list of problems, defined with appropriate scientific rigour, would be more than sufficient as a 
basis for individual care planning, for communicating between professionals, as the basis for research and for the 
design and planning of services. It would be inappropriate to try to generate a comprehensive list here. If such a list 
were in fact necessary (we don’t, for example, feel the need to have a list of all the reasons why a person gets into 
debt), it should be developed with a degree of professional and international consensus. But it is relatively easy to 
see how it might work. While the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ is confusing and unhelpful, we understand what it 
means when someone has low mood, has auditory hallucinations, or intrusive anxious thoughts or performs 
compulsive behaviours.  
We can identify and define such specific phenomena with proper scientific rigour. The scientific method - "a method 
or procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, consisting in systematic observation, 
measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses" (The Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2013) – is well-established and commands widespread support. Applied scientists such as clinical 
psychologists use operational definitions of relevant concepts. We develop hypotheses. We collect data. We don’t 
need to meet the challenge of a new technological alternative to diagnosis and the “disease model”. We’ve had it 
since the 17th century. So what would it look like in practice if we adopted this approach? 
The client’s experience 
Many people say that they find a name or a diagnostic label helpful. However there are good reasons to believe 
that this perceived helpfulness results from the experience that, when given a diagnosis, the client knows that their 
problems are recognised (in both senses of the word), understood, validated, explained (and explicable) and they 
have some sense that help is forthcoming. This has two consequences. First, unfortunately, clients often find that 
the diagnostic approach fail to deliver. Since, as I have argued, diagnoses are often unreliable, invalid and 
separate inappropriately the person from their experiences, the benefits for the client are often marginal at best. 
Secondly, there is absolutely no reason why these benefits cannot follow from a different approach. A clear 
description of a person’s real problems in ordinary language would clearly meet all these criteria. 
In practice, then, clients would no longer find the experience of helpfulness dependent on the acceptance of 
Latinised or otherwise obscure medical terms that signal the official acceptance of the reality of their problems, but 
also distance both them and us from the reality of their experiences. We would all start to use common-sense 
language to communicate a shared understanding. 
Psychosocial formulations 
As we have argued elsewhere (Kinderman et al., 2012) clinicians are likely to be more effective if they respond to 
an individual’s particular difficulties rather than their diagnostic label. Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists do not, 
in practice, base their plans for care merely on lists of problems or, indeed, diagnoses. In order to understand and 
explain people’s experiences, and to plan care, we develop ‘formulations’ (Division of Clinical Psychology, 2011). 
 Psychopathology Review, Volume 2 (2015), Issue 1, 154-161 157 
For clinical psychologists, it is via these formulations that we can incorporate social causal factors such as poverty, 
unemployment and trauma and the psychological processes that mediate our responses to those events in order to 
understand the problems with which people present to services. These formulations, for all professionals, are 
central elements of clinical practice. But such formulations are just as easily developed to address problems as 
they are to address diagnostic entities. In fact, because such diagnostic entities lack validity, it is much easier and 
more appropriate to develop formulations around specific operationally defined problems. Moreover, since the 
diagnostic approach tends towards a simplistic ‘diagnose and treat’ mentality, and mitigates against finding 
meaning in a person’s experiences, there is a danger that such issues are under-emphasised in services 
dominated by a diagnostic approach. 
Communication between professionals 
Many mental health professionals argue that a key function of diagnoses, a key reason for their use, is to facilitate 
communication between professionals. This is vital, of course, and the diagnostic system is widely used and well 
understood. We are all familiar with the experience of receiving letters discussing clients’ problems with reference 
to diagnoses. The presumption is that these diagnostic labels help us to communicate with each other, and are 
helpful in making treatment decisions. But in reality, this presumed communicative benefit is rather elusive. 
Diagnoses are invalid in many respects, including because it is possible for two people with the same diagnosis to 
have entirely different experiences or problems. Equally, diagnosis seems to be only very loosely associated with 
prognosis or treatment decisions (Moncrieff, 2008). In short, diagnoses are unhelpful for the purpose of 
communication. In the immediate aftermath of the publication of DSM-5, and of the criticisms of that document, one 
senior and influential contributor to an on-line blog (hosted by a well known and respected institution) tried to 
defuse this row by saying that; “clinicians need to communicate to each other, and even a wrong diagnosis allows 
them to do so”. This appears rather unhelpful. 
A ‘problem-based’ approach would serve the needs of professionals to communicate with each other very well. It is 
clear how precision would be served by communication based on the listing of key, operationally defined, 
problems. In order to facilitate such communication, it would be helpful if professionals, internationally, were to 
agree on the operational definitions of these problems. There is no reason to suppose that this would be an 
extensive or unmanageable list. In two as yet unpublished research studies by doctoral students (Gemma Parker 
and Kate Allsopp), we analysed the specific problems or symptoms that were listed in DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1992) respectively. Rather unexpectedly, 
only some 65 different specific symptoms were represented in the much larger number of diagnostic categories in 
DSM-IV, and only some 57 common presenting problems underpinned ICD-10. This is a fascinating observation. It 
means that the very large number of different diagnoses can be explained in part by the huge variety of ways in in 
which these problems can be combined. And that gives considerable (and welcome) flexibility to clinicians and 
researchers. If we imagine a scenario where a clinician writes to a colleague listing their client’s three major 
problems, using an agreed taxonomy of problems, there are over 175 thousand different possible three-problem 
combinations. Simple systems, if used elegantly, are more than capable of conveying huge complexity. 
This way of using a list of well-defined problems highlights the important differences between a problem-based and 
a diagnostic system. In the well-publicised launch of DSM-5, and the subsequent criticism, it would have been easy 
to misunderstand these differences. Indeed, the casual addition of ‘disorder’ to a definition of a problem by 
diagnosticians is partly to blame for this confusion. Thus, for example, when a person is traumatised by war, it 
makes sense to think about ‘post-traumatic stress’. That definition itself has major problems, not least of which is 
the definition of ‘stress’. But it is significant to consider the differences between a problem-list approach and a 
diagnostic approach. It is very different to talk about ‘post traumatic stress’ and a diagnosis of post traumatic stress 
‘disorder’ or PTSD. When we recommend replacing diagnoses with simple problem-lists, it is common for 
colleagues strongly wedded to the diagnostic tradition to suggest that they are essentially the same thing – both 
that a set of diagnoses essentially consists of a list of problems, and that a list of specific problems is functionally 
equivalent to a list of diagnoses. But there are many essential differences, and the case of PTSD illustrates them. 
Diagnoses are generated by combining symptoms with “if-then” rules. A problem-list approach explicitly keeps 
these problems individuated. It is only a very small number of diagnoses that have essentially only one symptom. 
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So, in practice, diagnoses obfuscate the possible relationships – and on-relationships – between problems. This 
means that, whereas diagnoses inappropriately cluster problems that may, or may not, be linked, an individual 
problem-based approach permits flexibility and clarity.  
But there are other differences too. There is a fundamental philosophical difference between the epistemologically 
neutral identification of a problem and the identification of a ‘symptom’; with the clear implication in the latter case 
that the symptom is the result of an illness, and probably a biological illness at that. Perhaps most importantly, a 
problem-based approach makes much more explicit the links from social and real-world causes (assault, abuse, 
poverty, loss, unemployment etc) through the mediating psychological processes (the ways in which we appraise, 
understand and respond to these events) to the emotional and psychological sequels – the identified problems. Of 
course, until we adopt a non-diagnostic approach to identifying and addressing emotional and psychological 
problems, these ideas must remain speculation. However it seems reasonable to hypothesise that, whereas 
medical diagnoses tend to place distance between the problems (which become a diagnosis) and the person, their 
experiences, and their appraisal of, response to and the meaning they attach to that experience, a problem-based 
approach places the experience more squarely in real-world human life. 
To return, then, to the issue of communication between professionals; for clinicians, working in multidisciplinary 
teams, the most useful approach would be to develop individual formulations; consisting of a summary of an 
individual’s problems and circumstances, hypothesis about their origins and possible therapeutic solutions. As with 
direct clinical work, such an approach would yield all the benefits of the traditional ‘diagnosis, treatment’ approach 
without its many inadequacies and dangers. This would require all clinicians— doctors, nurses and other 
professionals—to adopt new ways of thinking. In practice, we would see letters or reports that take the form of: 
“Dear Dr Freud, 
I would be grateful if you could offer an appointment to my client, [DEMOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION (name, age, gender, address etc)] and offer advice and, if appropriate, 
assistance. 
[NAME] reports that she experienced [CHILDHOOD EVENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE] in her 
childhood and more recently [RECENT EVENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE]. She reports that 
she [SPECIFY RESPONSE]. Now, she reports that she is experiencing [SPECIFIC 
PROBLEM #1], [SPECIFIC PROBLEM #2], [SPECIFIC PROBLEM #3]. We would 
appreciate your help and assistance. 
 Sincerely, Dr Jung” 
 
Research 
Many researchers, trying to understand the causes of, and proper responses to, such distress find their activity 
actively hampered by the diagnostic systems currently used. This is particularly true for people pursuing more 
psychosocial approaches. Since the different symptomatic problems incorporated under a diagnostic label do not 
cluster together in meaningful ways; do not yield valid diagnostic syndromes, it is unreasonable to presume that 
there are common underlying pathologies that are amenable to research. In other words, since the problems do not 
appear systematically to be related one to another, research into any underlying process will be significantly 
ineffective. We can think of any number of examples; the different experiences of depressed mood, with or without 
accompanying anxiety; the depressive and hypomanic episodes of ‘bipolar disorder’ which appear to be in a 
mathematically chaotic relationship (Gottschalk, Bauer, & Whybrow, 1995) or hallucinations and delusional beliefs 
in ‘schizophrenia’ which may (or may not) involve dopaminergic pathways, but are clearly not driven by identical 
mechanisms.  
Equally, the latest biological research supports the notion of non-specific links between a rather large number of 
genetic elements and a rather large number of quite general mental health problems (Cross-Disorder Group of the 
Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2013). Specificity appears to be rather difficult to establish in biological research 
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into diagnostic categories. To uncover more specific pathways from environmental trauma to the observed distress 
requires a much more well-specified account of the problems themselves. Whether we are researching biological, 
psychological or social causes of distress, an invalid diagnostic system can only ever be an active hindrance. If the 
diagnostic categories such as ‘schizophrenia’ are invalid, researchers could never uncover ‘its cause’. So 
researchers would be better advised to study the nature of, causes of and appropriate help to be offered in 
response to specific, identified problems. Fortunately, this process has already begun; there is a rich literature on 
the social origins, biological correlates and sequalae of specific mental health phenomena (eg, hallucinations, 
paranoid delusions and thought disorder) stretching over the last 20 years.  
Planning, commissioning and audit 
At present, much of healthcare is planned, audited and commissioned on the basis of diagnosis - or so it is 
sometimes argued. That latter, slightly cynical, clause is necessary because in fact, and entirely properly, 
commissioning of service is not directly related to diagnosis. The UK benefits from the fact that it presently enjoys 
healthcare provision via the National Health Service, a comprehensive system ensuring world-class healthcare 
available to all, free at the point of need and predicated on the principles of universal and equitable provision. Other 
nations are less fortunate, and still rely heavily on either commercial provision or on services funded through 
insurance. In these latter schemes, diagnosis is particularly important in gaining access to services, and is 
therefore particularly pernicious. In the UK, diagnostic information – incidence and prevalence – are important, but 
not of overwhelming significance. Services are commissioned, now in liaison with local authority social services 
through the joint Health and Wellbeing Boards, on the basis of a wide range of parameters, which certainly includes 
prevalence statistics, which in turn rely on diagnostic information, but are not dominated by them. Thus, for 
example, the authorities responsible for commissioning services will attempt to respond to the reported levels of 
anxiety and depression in the community (perhaps via initiatives such as the well-known IAPT or Improving Access 
to Psychological Therapies programme), but also support parenting classes for parents of children with a range of 
difficulties, fund artistic and literary services, and commission services that support people in returning to work etc.  
The point is that invalid and inappropriate diagnostic systems do cast a shadow over commissioning and planning 
services, just as they do over clinical practice and research. That could, perhaps, mean that some of the more 
extreme fears of the influence of diagnosis should be tempered. But it also means that we can easily imagine a 
system for the commissioning of services that was not predicated on diagnosis (the logic can’t possibly both mean 
that diagnoses are necessary for commissioning and planning and that people already use non-diagnostic 
approaches in this regard). In services other than healthcare – in education, in social services, in criminal justice 
services – we do not rely on diagnosis. That doesn’t mean that such services are aimless or random. Instead, well-
developed systems of service commissioning are in place, systems based upon the identification of problems and 
the evidence-based formulation of a plan for responding. Currently, in the UK, there is discussion in mental health 
services about the basis of a remuneration and commissioning system called ‘payment by results’. This approach is 
not a diagnostic system, and – importantly – identifies service users’ problems on a non-diagnostic basis. Precisely 
because people with a particular diagnosis (say, for instance, ‘generalised anxiety disorder’ or ‘schizophrenia’) 
differ hugely in their needs for service provision, the guidance for commissioners, service managers and clinicians 
are based not on diagnosis but on a cluster of specific but trans-diagnostic problems and needs. These initiatives 
are controversial, both because they represent changes to service provision and management of health services 
(which, of course, involved politics) and because many people feel that it is inappropriate to move away from a 
diagnostic approach. In this debate, they are important because, again, they offer examples of non-diagnostic 
frameworks for healthcare planning and commissioning. 
We do, of course, need to know the extent of the problems that we have to address, and the scale of the response 
demanded. We need to know how many psychological therapists, how many psychologists, how many psychiatrists 
to employ. We need to know what type of residential services to commission, and how many people will be needed 
to staff them. Even as we pose these questions, the inadequacy of diagnoses becomes a little clearer. When we 
think about the details, it becomes clearer too. While we do need to know the extent of the problems; how many 
working days are lost each year to emotional problems, for instance; how many educational psychologists are 
needed to support our schoolchildren; how many psychological therapists are needed, for example, it seems 
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equally clear that diagnostic classification will not help us here. It is clearly beneficial for all of us – for the clients 
themselves, for employers, for the nation as a whole – to help people with mental health problems remain in work 
or to find work. And of course the majority of people with mental health problems – the majority of the one in four of 
us – are in work. It follows that the important questions are not really answered by diagnosis at all. We can’t simply 
assess how many people might need different kinds of services – or none at all - on the basis of diagnosis and 
prevalence. 
It follows that commissioners and planners of services need answers to questions unrelated to diagnosis. They 
need to know how many people experience certain problems, the health economics of those problems, and the 
recommended interventions. We need to base our services on the assessment of needs. As in other aspects of 
public services, these are largely unrelated to diagnosis. It is a perfectly valid question to ask how many 
employment advisors are needed in our mental health services, but diagnostic information is an inadequate way to 
answer that question. Once again, real-world, pragmatic data re needed.  
A new ethos 
In short, then, we must move away from the ‘disease-model’, which assumes that emotional distress is merely 
symptomatic of biological illness, and instead embrace a model of mental health and well-being that recognises our 
essential and shared humanity. We should stop diagnosing non-existent illnesses – a simple list of people’s 
problems (properly defined) would be more than sufficient as a basis for individual care planning and for the design 
and planning of services. But we also need to do more. Diagnostic reform is only a small part of the reforms 
needed in mental health care.  
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